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Theme 1 · Passage 22

Theme 1 · Passage 22

Attributed to Socrates (via Plato, Xenophon, and others)

Greek

ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀδικῶ κατὰ τὴν Μελήτου γραφήν, οὐ πολλῆς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπολογίας, ἀλλὰ ἱκανὰ καὶ ταῦτα· ὃ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι πολλή μοι ἀπέχθεια γέγονεν καὶ πρὸς πολλούς, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι ἀληθές ἐστιν. καὶ τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ὃ ἐμὲ αἱρεῖ, ἐάνπερ αἱρῇ, οὐ Μέλητος οὐδὲ Ἄνυτος ἀλλʼ ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος. ἃ δὴ πολλοὺς καὶ ἄλλους καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ᾕρηκεν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ αἱρήσει· οὐδὲν δὲ δεινὸν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στῇ. ἴσως ἂν οὖν εἴποι τις· εἶτʼ οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοιοῦτον ἐπιτήδευμα ἐπιτηδεύσας ἐξ οὗ κινδυνεύεις νυνὶ ἀποθανεῖν; ἐγὼ δὲ τούτῳ ἂν δίκαιον λόγον ἀντείποιμι, ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, εἰ οἴει δεῖν κίνδυνον ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι ἄνδρα ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελός ἐστιν, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐκεῖνο μόνον σκοπεῖν ὅταν πράττῃ, πότερον δίκαια ἢ ἄδικα πράττει, καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἔργα ἢ κακοῦ. φαῦλοι γὰρ ἂν τῷ γε σῷ λόγῳ εἶεν τῶν ἡμιθέων ὅσοι ἐν Τροίᾳ τετελευτήκασιν οἵ τε ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος υἱός, ὃς τοσοῦτον τοῦ κινδύνου κατεφρόνησεν παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρόν τι ὑπομεῖναι ὥστε, ἐπειδὴ εἶπεν ἡ μήτηρ αὐτῷ προθυμουμένῳ Ἕκτορα ἀποκτεῖναι, θεὸς οὖσα, οὑτωσί πως, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι· ὦ παῖ, εἰ τιμωρήσεις Πατρόκλῳ τῷ ἑταίρῳ τὸν φόνον καὶ Ἕκτορα ἀποκτενεῖς, αὐτὸς ἀποθανῇ—αὐτίκα γάρ τοι, φησί, μεθʼ Ἕκτορα πότμος ἑτοῖμος —ὁ δὲ τοῦτο ἀκούσας τοῦ μὲν θανάτου καὶ τοῦ κινδύνου ὠλιγώρησε, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον δείσας τὸ ζῆν κακὸς ὢν καὶ τοῖς φίλοις μὴ τιμωρεῖν, αὐτίκα, φησί, τεθναίην, δίκην ἐπιθεὶς τῷ ἀδικοῦντι, ἵνα μὴ ἐνθάδε μένω καταγέλαστος παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν ἄχθος ἀρούρης. ὴ αὐτὸν οἴει φροντίσαι θανάτου καὶ κινδύνου;οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ

Transliteration

alla gar, ō andres Athēnaioi, hōs men egō ouk adikō kata tēn Melētou graphēn, ou pollēs moi dokei einai apologias, alla hikana kai tauta ho de kai en tois emprosthen elegon, hoti pollē moi apechtheia gegonen kai pros pollous, eu iste hoti alēthes estin. kai toutʼ estin ho eme hairei, eanper hairē, ou Melētos oude Anytos allʼ hē tōn pollōn diabolē te kai phthonos. ha dē pollous kai allous kai agathous andras hērēken, oimai de kai hairēsei ouden de deinon mē en emoi stē. isōs an oun eipoi tis eitʼ ouk aischynē, ō Sōkrates, toiouton epitēdeuma epitēdeusas ex hou kindyneueis nyni apothanein; egō de toutō an dikaion logon anteipoimi, hoti ou kalōs legeis, ō anthrōpe, ei oiei dein kindynon hypologizesthai tou zēn ē tethnanai andra hotou ti kai smikron ophelos estin, allʼ ouk ekeino monon skopein hotan prattē, poteron dikaia ē adika prattei, kai andros agathou erga ē kakou. phauloi gar an tō ge sō logō eien tōn hēmitheōn hosoi en Troia teteleutēkasin hoi te alloi kai ho tēs THetidos huios, hos tosouton tou kindynou katephronēsen para to aischron ti hypomeinai hōste, epeidē eipen hē mētēr autō prothymoumenō hEktora apokteinai, theos ousa, houtōsi pōs, hōs egō oimai ō pai, ei timōrēseis Patroklō tō hetairō ton phonon kai hEktora apokteneis, autos apothanē—autika gar toi, phēsi, methʼ hEktora potmos hetoimos h—o de touto akousas tou men thanatou kai tou kindynou ōligōrēse, poly de mallon deisas to zēn kakos ōn kai tois philois mē timōrein, autika, phēsi, tethnaiēn, dikēn epitheis tō adikounti, hina mē enthade menō katagelastos para nēusi korōnisin achthos arourēs. ē auton oiei phrontisai thanatou kai hkindynou;oytō gar echei, ō andres Athēnaioi, tē alētheia

Translation

But indeed, O men of Athens, as I do not commit injustice according to the indictment of Meletus, I do not think I have much of a defense, but these are sufficient; and what I said before, that much enmity has arisen against me and towards many, you know well that it is true. And this is what chooses me, if it chooses, not Meletus nor Anytus but the slander and envy of the many. This has indeed chosen many others and good men, and I think it will choose again; but there is nothing terrible in me. Perhaps someone might say, 'Then do you not feel shame, O Socrates, having pursued such a practice from which you are now in danger of dying?' I would then rightly reply to this, that you do not speak well, O man, if you think that a man ought to calculate the danger of living or dying for some small benefit, but should not only consider whether he is acting justly or unjustly, and the deeds of a good man or a bad one. For according to your reasoning, those demigods who died in Troy would be contemptible, both the others and the son of Thetis, who so despised the danger of enduring something shameful that, when his mother said to him, eager to kill Hector, being a goddess, thus somehow, as I think: 'O child, if you take vengeance on Patroclus, your companion, for his death and kill Hector, you yourself will die— for indeed, she says, your fate is ready with Hector'—and he, having heard this, disregarded both death and danger, but fearing much more to live being bad and not avenging his friends, immediately, she says, I would rather die, imposing justice on the wrongdoer.

Literal meaning: But indeed, O men of Athens, as I do not commit injustice according to the indictment of Meletus, I do not think I have much of a defense, but these are sufficient; and what I said before, that much enmity has arisen against me and towards many, you know well that it is true. And this is what chooses me, if it chooses, not Meletus nor Anytus but the slander and envy of the many. This has indeed chosen many others and good men, and I think it will choose again; but there is nothing terrible in me. Perhaps someone might say, 'Then do you not feel shame, O Socrates, having pursued such a practice from which you are now in danger of dying?' I would then rightly reply to this, that you do not speak well, O man, if you think that a man ought to calculate the danger of living or dying for some small benefit, but should not only consider whether he is acting justly or unjustly, and the deeds of a good man or a bad one. For according to your reasoning, those demigods who died in Troy would be contemptible, both the others and the son of Thetis, who so despised the danger of enduring something shameful that, when his mother said to him, eager to kill Hector, being a goddess, thus somehow, as I think: 'O child, if you take vengeance on Patroclus, your companion, for his death and kill Hector, you yourself will die— for indeed, she says, your fate is ready with Hector'—and he, having heard this, disregarded both death and danger, but fearing much more to live being bad and not avenging his friends, immediately, she says, I would rather die, imposing justice on the wrongdoer.

Explanation

Socrates emphasizes the importance of acting justly over fearing death, suggesting that living a life of virtue is more valuable than avoiding danger for trivial gains.

In this passage, Socrates addresses the men of Athens, asserting that he does not believe he is guilty of the charges brought against him by Meletus. He acknowledges that he has faced significant hostility and envy from many people, which he believes is the true reason for his predicament, rather than any actual wrongdoing on his part. Socrates challenges the notion that one should fear death or the dangers of life when it comes to pursuing justice and virtue. He argues that a person should not calculate the risks of living or dying for minor benefits, but rather focus on whether their actions are just or unjust. He uses the example of the demigods from the Trojan War, particularly Achilles, who chose to act honorably and avenge his friend Patroclus, even at the cost of his own life. Socrates implies that the true measure of a man is not in avoiding death but in living a life of integrity and moral courage, even in the face of danger.

Source edition (provenance)

perseus:tlg0059.tlg002.perseus-grc2; plato:apology; section 28 part 1; transliteration: greek-transliteration (build)

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