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Work 1 · Passage 168

Work 1 · Passage 168

Stoic tradition

Greek

Ὁποῖά τινά ἐστι τὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκοῦντα ἀγαθά, κἂν ἐντεῦθεν λάβοις. εἰ γάρ τις ἐπινοήσειεν ὑπάρχοντά τινα ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθά, οἷον φρόνησιν, σωφροσύνην, δικαιοσύνην, ἀνδρείαν, οὐκ ἂν ταῦτα προεπινοήσας ἐπακοῦσαι δυνηθείη τό· ʽὑπὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶνʼ, οὐ γὰρ ἐφαρμόσει. τὰ δέ γε τοῖς πολλοῖς φαινόμενα ἀγαθὰ προεπινοήσας τις ἐπακούσεται καὶ ῥᾳδίως δέξεται ὡς οἰκείως ἐπιλεγόμενον τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ κωμικοῦ εἰρημένον. οὕτως καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ φαντάζονται τὴν διαφοράν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τοῦτο μὲν οὐ προσέκοπτε καὶ ἀπηξιοῦτο, τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ πλούτου καὶ τῶν πρὸς τρυφὴν ἢ δόξαν εὐκληρημάτων παρεδεχόμεθα ὡς ἱκνουμένως καὶ ἀστείως εἰρημένον. πρόιθι οὖν καὶ ἐρώτα, εἰ τιμητέον καὶ ἀγαθὰ ὑποληπτέον τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὧν προεπινοηθέντων οἰκείως ἂν ἐπιφέροιτο τὸ τὸν κεκτημένον αὐτὰ ὑπὸ τῆς εὐπορίας ʽοὐκ ἔχειν ὅποι χέσῃʼ.

Transliteration

hOpoia tina esti ta tois pollois dokounta agatha, kan enteuthen labois. ei gar tis epinoēseien hyparchonta tina hōs alēthōs agatha, hoion phronēsin, sōphrosynēn, dikaiosynēn, andreian, ouk an tauta proepinoēsas epakousai dynētheiē to hʽypo tōn agathōnʼ, ou gar epharmosei. ta de ge tois pollois phainomena agatha proepinoēsas tis epakousetai kai rhadiōs dexetai hōs oikeiōs epilegomenon to hypo tou kōmikou eirēmenon. houtōs kai hoi polloi phantazontai tēn diaphoran ou gar an touto men ou prosekopte kai apēxiouto, to de epi tou ploutoy kai tōn pros tryphēn ē doxan euklērēmatōn paredechometha hōs hiknoumenōs kai asteiōs eirēmenon. proithi oun kai erōta, ei timēteon kai agatha hypolēpteon ta toiauta, hōn proepinoēthentōn oikeiōs an epipheroito to ton kektēmenon auta hypo tēs euporias ʽouk echein hopoi chesēʼ.

Translation

What are the things that seem good to the many, even if you were to obtain them from here? For if someone were to conceive of certain things as truly good, such as wisdom, temperance, justice, and courage, they would not be able to hear them as 'from the good ones,' for they would not fit. But someone who has pre-conceived the things that seem good to the many would hear them and readily accept them as if they were naturally chosen, as stated by the comic poet. Thus, the many also imagine the difference; for they would not reject this and would deem it unworthy, but they accept the things related to wealth and those pertaining to luxury or the reputation of good fortunes as if they were appropriately and humorously stated. Therefore, go ahead and ask if such things ought to be esteemed and considered good, of which, once pre-conceived, one would naturally bring forth the notion that the one who possesses them under prosperity 'has no place to relieve himself.'

Literal meaning: What kind of things are those that seem good to the many, even if you were to obtain them from here? For if someone were to think of certain things as truly good, such as wisdom, temperance, justice, and courage, they would not be able to hear them as 'from the good ones,' for they would not fit. But someone who has pre-conceived the things that seem good to the many would hear them and readily accept them as if they were naturally chosen, as stated by the comic poet. Thus, the many also imagine the difference; for they would not reject this and would deem it unworthy, but they accept the things related to wealth and those pertaining to luxury or the reputation of good fortunes as if they were appropriately and humorously stated. Therefore, go ahead and ask if such things ought to be esteemed and considered good, of which, once pre-conceived, one would naturally bring forth the notion that the one who possesses them under prosperity 'has no place to relieve himself.'

Explanation

The passage critiques how people often value superficial goods like wealth and luxury over true virtues such as wisdom and justice.

In this passage, the Stoic philosopher reflects on the nature of what is considered 'good' by the majority of people. The text suggests that while many might perceive wealth, luxury, and social status as good, these are not true goods in the Stoic sense. True goods, according to Stoicism, are virtues like wisdom, temperance, justice, and courage. The philosopher argues that if someone truly understood what constitutes genuine goodness, they would not accept the superficial goods as valuable. Instead, they would recognize that these external possessions do not align with the deeper, intrinsic values of virtue. The passage also highlights a tendency among people to accept these superficial goods humorously or without critical thought, indicating a societal norm that prioritizes appearances over substance. The final rhetorical question challenges the reader to reconsider whether these perceived goods should indeed be valued, especially when they lead to absurd conclusions about the nature of true prosperity.

Source edition (provenance)

perseus:tlg0562.tlg001.perseus-grc2; 5.12.1; transliteration: greek-transliteration (build)

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